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ABSTRACT 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) cassava-producing countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire have
developed, in recent years, a renewed interest in cassava as an alternative food crop.  This has led to a
major expansion in cassava-based production systems in Nigeria and Ghana, whereas there has been a
slower growth in Côte d’Ivoire (Nweke et al., 1998).  This paper is based on the argument that the
difference in various factors such as agricultural policies (i.e., trade and price policies, domestic production
taxes or subsidies), location and technologies (production and processing) between Nigeria, Ghana and
Côte d’Ivoire the difference in the level of growth in cassava-based production systems.
The paper examines, using the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM), the magnitude of the impact of these factors
on the private and social profitability of cassava production and post-production processing in Côte
d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria.  The topic has not been examined in previous studies.  The paper relies
primarily on data for Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria from the Collaborative Study of Cassava in Africa
(COSCA) survey.
The baseline results demonstrate the similarity in efficiencies of production in these West African countries. 
The simulation findings indicated that, in Côte d’Ivoire, farmers benefited from the depreciation of the
equilibrium exchange rate while farmers in Ghana and Nigeria suffered losses.  Simulation results also
indicated that Ivorian and Ghanaian cassava/maize farmers could benefit from growing IITA’s improved
variety and adopting mechanized processing methods.
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COMPARING THE PROFITABILITY OF CASSAVA-BASED PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
IN THREE WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES: COTE D’IVOIRE, GHANA AND NIGERIA.
1. Introduction
In most Sub-Saharan African countries, the agricultural sector has always, and still accounts
for the major share of GDP, foreign exchange, and employment. Yet, per capita food production has
not been able to keep pace with a rapidly expanding demand for food. As a result, Sub-Saharan
African (SSA) countries have become increasingly dependent on commercial imports and food aid
(World Bank, 1996). To reverse this trend, most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) governments have
been designing research programs and policy initiatives aimed at achieving national food security.
One of the many food crops being considered currently in this effort in SSA is cassava; both in
terms of its potential to ensure adequate food supply for all and generate rural household income,
thereby increasing access to food.  While this has led to a major expansion in cassava- based
production systems in Nigeria and Ghana, there has been a slower growth in Côte d’Ivoire (Nweke,
1998).
Cassava is an important commodity in many farming systems in Sub-Saharan Africa (Nweke
et al., 1994).  Its relative importance stems from its adaptability to a wide range of agro-ecologies,
including marginal lands and erratic rainfall conditions (Nweke et al., 1994). Regardless of the
production environment, compared to other crops, cassava has lower production risks, and provides
the possibility of maintaining a continuous food supply throughout the year (Nweke et al, 1994).
This paper is based on the argument that the difference in various factors such as agricultural
policies (i.e., trade and price policies, domestic production taxes or subsidies), location and
technologies (production and processing) between Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire explains the
difference in the level of growth in cassava-based production systems.  The paper uses the policy
analysis matrix (PAM) model to examine the magnitude of the impact of these various factors on2
the private and social profitability of cassava/maize production systems in Nigeria, Ghana and Côte
d’Ivoire.
The intent of this comparative study is to use policy analysis matrix (PAM) approach to push
analysis of the factors influencing profitability further than can be done within the context of a
single country. The main advantage of carrying out similar policy studies in a number of countries is
the scope presented for obtaining comparative insights.
2. Methodological Framework
2.1. A Short Description of the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) Model
  The Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) is the analytical framework used in this paper.
The PAM is a product of two accounting identities. The first identity holds that profit equals
revenues minus costs, measured either in financial or economic terms. The second identity measures
the effects of divergences between financial and economic values. The main empirical task is to
construct accounting matrices of revenues, costs and profits for each selected enterprise based on
representative synthetic farm-level and marketing budgets, using data on farming, farm-to-processor
marketing, processing, and processor-to-wholesaler marketing (Monke and Pearson, 1989).
The concept of profit is fundamental in PAM analysis. Profit, whether calculated at observed
market prices or at imputed social (efficiency) prices, is defined as the difference between revenues
(the value of outputs) and costs of all inputs. Measurement of costs and returns at private market
prices reveals the presence of any excess profits (defined as the difference between total returns and
the costs of all inputs, including capital) and the actual competitiveness of the enterprise. If market
prices for inputs or outputs differ from their values in alternative production or consumption uses,
actual competitiveness and profitability may be misleading indicators of the potential for growth.3
The most common source of such divergences is policies (Pearson et al., 1995).
Policy analysis can help explain the level of allocation of resources devoted to food
production by considering food as seen from the standpoint of different socioeconomic and political
agents. The commercial farmer sees food mainly as a source of income; the subsistence farmer sees
food as a means of subsistence and survival; and the policy-maker sees food as a source of
government income and as a strategic commodity, which can be used as a means of control or as an
instrument of social welfare. Food prices are policy instruments to the government, returns to
farmers and costs to the consumer. Agricultural input prices are policy instruments to the
government, costs to the farmers, and returns to the owners of factors of production (e.g., wages for
agricultural labor).
As an empirical framework, the PAM provides measures of economic efficiency and of
transfer effects of policy on particular commodities, technologies, and regions. This information is
used to explore several topics of interest to policymakers, such as the pattern of competitiveness and
the potential for the government to exploit competitive advantage; the formulation of public
investment policy to support particular commodities, regions and farm types; and the allocation of
public research and development expenditures within the agricultural sector. PAM results thus serve
as an information baseline for monitoring and evaluating the effects of policy and for identifying
policy-relevant research needs.
In this paper, first, private and social profitability of cassava/maize production systems in
each country is presented and analyzed under a baseline scenario. This is followed by the discussion
policy analysis matrix (PAM) results for each country. These results are organized by country to
provide a basis for: a) cross-country comparisons of technologies that dominate cassava/maize
production in West Africa, and b) comparisons of technologies within Nigeria. Comparisons4
between similar systems in different countries are also possible through a further extension of the
PAM analysis, from which policy-impact ratios (e.g. DRC, EPC) are produced.
Finally, the paper analyzes these “baseline” results further by considering the implications of
two scenarios for future change in selected technical parameters. The first scenario simulates
increases in yields in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. The second scenario considers the effects of changes
in the foreign exchange rates in the three countries.
2.2. Data
This study is based on data for Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria from the Collaborative
Study of Cassava in Africa (COSCA) survey. COSCA report number 2 provides a detailed
discussion of the data collection procedures and the associated sampling method. The survey
covered the period 1989/1991.
Data available in the COSCA survey that are used include farm-level technical coefficients,
processing costs, transformation rates of cassava root into processed products, sources of cassava
roots and destination of cassava products, unit storage costs, unit transportation costs, product and
input market prices and taxes and subsidy levels. In the case of green maize, data used were
obtained not only from the COSCA survey but also from primary sources of earlier studies and from
secondary sources such as the Office of Agricultural Statistics of each country’s Ministry of
Agriculture.
In addition, macroeconomic data needed in the estimation of economic prices (i.e., import
parity prices and shadow exchange prices) were obtained mostly from secondary sources such as
National Statistical Reports and from the IMF.
Unfortunately, the COSCA study did not record maize yields on its sample fields. Therefore,
in computing the enterprise budgets developed in this study, it was assumed that those fields got the5
average maize yield for the country which was then converted to the number of fresh corn ears using
the “Ear-Weight Method” discussed in the appendix. The numbers of corn ears were subsequently
valued at the fresh corn price.
3. Empirical Analyses
Cassava/maize production systems are examined in this section using a combination of
financial analysis, economic analysis and policy analysis. The tasks involved are the following:
1. To identify and select relevant estimates of private profitability (farm level and post-farm level)
and social profitability from the first two essays on Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria.
2. To develop enterprise budgets (financial and economic) for cassava/maize systems in Ghana
under a “baseline scenario”.
3. To construct a Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) for Ghana, using the information from the      
enterprise budgets and estimate ratio indicators such as DRC, NPC, etc.
4. To undertake sensitivity analyses in order to contrast the relative comparative advantage of each
country in cassava/maize production.
3.1. Private Profitability (PP)
In this subsection, separate financial farm–level and post-farm level budgets are developed
for Ghana, whereas estimates of private profitability (PP) indicators are taken from the previous
essays on Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria.This provides the database for establishing the relative
profitability of cassava/maize production systems in each country. Previous chapters not only
present a summary of the rationale that underlies farm budgets analysis, but also discuss in detail the
construction of farm budgets. The PP indicator shows the incentives, for each production system, to
alter the existing allocation of resources. If PP is positive, resources are encouraged to flow into the6
activity. If PP is negative, the direction of the flow is likely to be away.
3.1.1. Farm level Analysis
Cassava/maize enterprise budgets for the three countries are presented in tables A-1 through
A-3 in the appendix. Table 1 below summarizes the results of the baseline runs of the farm level
financial profitability analysis for Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria. The summary focuses mainly
on performance measures that can be used to identify the country where enterprises have the highest
financial return and lowest cost of production.
Table 1: Summary Estimates of Farm-Level Financial Budget Indicators (in US$ using

















Local/maize 804.56 6.00 755.49 487.20
IITA/maize NA NA NA NA
GHANA
Local/maize 742.58 5.34 1266.50 419.33
IITA/maize NA NA NA NA
NIGERIA
Local/maize 519.65 3.24 903.60 320.80
IITA/maize 742.70 4.29 962.18 530.24
Source: tables A-1, A-2 and A-3 in the appendix
Note: in terms of prevailing exchange rates, 1US dollar= 266 fcfa (in Cote d’Ivoire) = 430 cedis (in
Ghana) = 17 nairas (in Nigeria)
Results in table 1 clearly show that the production system that is common to the three
countries is the local landrace variety /maize system. However, the PP estimates as shown in table 1
also clearly indicates that IITA’s improved cassava varieties generate the highest net profits.
When converted to a per person-day basis, the returns to family labor for local land race
variety/maize systems (RFL) are US $ 6.00 in Cote d’Ivoire, US $ 5.34 in Ghana and US $ 3.247
dollars in Nigeria. In the three countries, the RFL per person-day is higher than the average daily
wage rate paid to the hired labor, which are $2.40 in Cote d’Ivoire, $2.33 in Ghana and $1.23 in
Nigeria. Thus, there is no financial advantage to family members in any of these countries to seek
wage employment in urban areas or other farms, when they are needed on their farms in the village.
Furthermore, results in table 1 underline the remarkable stability of the RFL per person-day as a
proportion of agricultural wage rates across countries (ranging from 2.3 to 2.6 times the agricultural
wage rates).
  Results in table 1 also indicate that price incentives have enabled local landrace
variety/maize systems to earn positive private profits per hectare that do not vary enormously across
countries: US $ 487.20 in Cote d’Ivoire, US $ 419.33 in Ghana and US $ 320.80 in Nigeria.
3.1.2. Post-harvest Level Financial Analysis
It is assumed that green maize is harvested and consumed or sold at the farm level.
Therefore, only cassava roots harvested are taken to the next level  (the village) to be processed.
Cassava processing methods involve a combination of activities such as peeling, grating and
toasting. Of these activities, grating is the most labor intensive. In this study, a process is defined as
traditional if grating is performed manually. Mechanized processing method involves the use of
various types of mechanical cassava graters, which are driven by electrical, petrol, or diesel engines.
 The major form into which cassava roots are processed in Nigeria and Ghana is gari, which is made
of toasted cassava granules. In Cote d’Ivoire, attieke (steamed cassava granules) is the major form
into which roots are processed.
  Transformation coefficients were computed and used to calculate actual attieke and gari
yields under each technology combination. The technology combination common to the three8
countries was the “Locman”
1. Yields were valued by the weighted average consumer price based on
COSCA village survey data. It should be noted that prices vary a lot from season to season, mainly
because of changing season conditions (e.g., abundance vs. hungry seasons). To account for this
diversity, the weighted average price was estimated. Since farmers do not own processing machines,
no fixed costs was assigned processing enterprises. Table 2 summarizes the results of the post-farm
level budget analysis for the three countries under the technology combination “Locman”. Table 3
summarizes the results of the post-farm level budget analysis for Nigeria under alternative
technology combinations.
Table 2: Summary Estimates of Post-farm Level Financial Budget Indicators (in US$
using prevailing Exchange Rates) for Processed Products (Attieke in Cote










COTE D’IVOIRE 1.36 0.18 -57.20
GHANA 2.12 0.27 -6.65
NIGERIA 1.00 0.19 -15.12
 Source: tables A-4, A-5 and A-6 in the appendix.
Note: using the prevailing exchange rates, 1 US dollar= 266 fcfa (in Cote d’Ivoire) = 430 cedis (in
Ghana) = 17 nairas (in Nigeria)
Table 3: Summary Estimates of Postfarm-Level Financial Budget Indicators (in US$ using













Impmech 1.94 0.16 49.41
Locmech 1.18 0.18 -1.65
Locman 1.00 0.19 -15.12
Impman 0.76 0.19 -40.65
Source: table A-19 in the appendix
 
Results in table 2 indicate that processing costs differ slightly between the three countries.
                                                
1 The production and processing technology combination “Locman” is defined as follows: local cassava variety
+ manual grating method9
Attieke production in Cote d’Ivoire is cheaper than gari production in Ghana or Nigeria. However,
profits are negative in the three countries.
Results in table 3 show that in Nigeria, only cassava/maize systems under “Impmech”
technology combination had a positive net enterprise profits (NEP). These results also show that
mechanized processing methods have a definite cost-saving advantage over traditional processing
methods. The “Impmech” technology combination has the lowest cost of production per kilogram of
gari ($0.16 US/kg). This implies that farmers have incentives to adopt that technology combination.
In fact, these findings are consistent with farmers’ behavior in Nigeria. As mentioned earlier,
COSCA data for Nigeria show that, in the 65 villages representing cassava-growing areas, most
farmers (85 percent) grew the improved varieties. Of these farmers, 54 percent used mechanized
processing method.
However, it should be noted that the negative NEPs observed under the other technology
combinations do not mean that farmers are losing money. Rather, they mean that net margin is not
enough to yield a positive return to the management factor when the costs of other factors are taken
into account. In fact, the post-farm level financial budgets presented in tables A-4 through A-6 in
the appendix show that all the NEPs, assuming zero opportunity cost of labor, are positive.
The COSCA survey data indicate that women control post-harvest activities in the three
countries and receive all the benefits from those activities.  In addition, when asked why they were
involved in this activity only, their answer was that there is no better alternative. That is, they have
fewer or no opportunities for employment at the assumed “prevailing” rural wage.
This situation reflects the segmentation of the rural labor market for cassava farming systems
in West Africa. Women manage a very important part of cassava production systems: 1) they
predominate in cassava processing and attieke and gari preparation and, 2) they devote a large10
amounts of time in obtaining the fuel and water required to make cassava processed products ready
for sale or home consumption. . Yet this analysis suggests that returns to women from these
activities are below the rural wage rate, which is available mainly to men.
3.2. Social Profitability (SP)
The COSCA data indicate that, in Nigeria, about 79 percent of farmers who produce gari are
net sellers, in Ghana about 70 percent of farmers who produce gari are net sellers, and in Cote
d’Ivoire about 65 percent of farmers who produce attieke are net sellers. Therefore, this analysis
focuses on commercial cassava/maize systems only.
The farm level economic returns for each country were calculated using import parity prices
(tables A-7 through A-9b in the appendix) of cassava roots and financial prices of green maize at
selected regional markets: Bonoua and N’douci in Cote d’Ivoire, Koforidua and Kumasi in Ghana
and Abeokuta and Onitsha in Nigeria. These markets were selected because they are located in
regions where farmers ranked cassava as the most important crop in the farming system (Nweke et
al., 1998).  The economic budgets are presented in tables A-10 through A-15 in the appendix. 
The economic budgets were estimated according to the following assumptions: 1) It is
assumed that green maize is nontraded and that its price is not distorted by government policies.
Therefore, its financial price (the observed market price) reflects its shadow price; 2) Gari, the main
cassava product in Nigeria and Ghana, and attieke, the main cassava product in Cote d’Ivoire, are
not traded internationally, but tapioca, another cassava product and the closest substitute of attieke
and gari is traded internationally. Consequently, the price of imported tapioca was used to estimate
the import parity of cassava root; and 3) the official exchange rates (266 francs cfa to $1US for Cote
d’Ivoire, 430 cedis to $1US for Ghana and 17 nairas to $1US for Nigeria) were adjusted to reflect
their equilibrium values net of distortions. The premium used for this adjustments were 48 percent11
for Cote d’Ivoire, 50 percent for Ghana and 30 percent for Nigeria respectively (Stryker, 1990).
Net social profit (SP), measured in world prices or their equivalent, in fact, diverges widely
from the PP. The SP indicators shown in tables 4 and 5 below indicate that there is significant
variation in SP among countries and between techniques.  However, these SP indicators also suggest
that all countries are able to substitute profitably local production of cassava/maize for imports. The
only exceptions are systems under the technology combination “Impman” in Nigeria when outputs
are sold in Abeokuta.
However, the systems under the “Impmech” technology combination in Nigeria, are clearly
the most efficient use of national resources. They generate significantly higher net social profits
(NSP) per hectare at both regional output markets (US$ 290.00 in Abeokuta and US$ 684.32 in
Onitsha). The net social profit (NSP) refers to the difference, valued in border and shadow prices,
between the gross value of output and the total costs of all inputs (traded and nontraded
intermediary and primary inputs).
 A more efficient use of resources means that one can produce more from what one has and
attain a higher level of welfare. Measures of NSP, like DRC, may give an idea of the comparative
advantage in the agricultural commodity system. In addition, measures of NSP may give an idea of
the comparative advantage or efficiency in the agricultural commodity system. Thus, NSP measures
are very informative for decision-makers and allocators of research funds, if the technical changes
they might introduce would attempt to break labor or other constraints in cassava/maize systems.
It should be noted that all systems are more profitable financially than they are socially. That
is, there are net transfers to farmers (tables A-10 through A-15 in the appendix). The subsequent
PAM analysis will help illustrate the sources of these transfers.12
Table 4: Summary Estimates of Farm-Level Economic Budget Indicators (in US$ using
Shadow Exchange Rate) For Commercial Cassava/Maize Production Systems
at Each Regional Output Market, by Country:1989/1991
















Bonoua 306.54 2.18 535.30 81.08
N’douci 413.26 2.89 534.06 184.60
GHANA Koforidua 417.36 2.87 846.62 192.56
Kumassi 557.60 3.52 858.90 311.83
NIGERIA Abeokuta 235.18 1.81 647.80 113.00
Onitsha 420.00 2.51 722.64 261.50
Source: tables A-10, A-12 and A-14 in the appendix.
Note: using the shadow exchange rates, 1US $ equals 394 fcfa (in C.I.), equals 645cedis (in Ghana),
equals 22 nairas (in Nigeria).
Table 5: Summary Estimates of Farm-Level Economic Budget Indicators (in US$ using
Shadow Exchange Rates) For Commercial Cassava/Maize Production Systems




















Impmech 460.80 2.60 794.23 290.00
Locmech 303.00 2.40 674.80 180.82
Locman 235.20 1.81 674.80 113.00
Impman 112.30 0.64 794.23 -3.5
Onitsha
Impmech 858.04 4.73 783.00 684.32
Locmech 504.00 3.05 722.64 345.60
Locman 420.00 2.54 722.64 261.50
Impman 392.14 2.13 783.00 218.41
Source: COSCA data and tables A-9a and A-9b in the appendix
3.3.Policy Matrix Analysis
By completing a PAM for a production system one can simultaneously determine the13
economic efficiency of the system, the degree of policy-induced transfers on the input /output
markets, and the extent to which resources are transferred among agents (Yao, 1997). First, the
PAM was constructed using the information on costs and returns obtained from the financial and
economic analyses. Second, the extent of policy-induced transfers is computed. Third, six PAM
policy-indicators were derived for policy analysis. They are: the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC),
the Nominal Protection Coefficient on Tradable Output (NPCO), the Nominal Protection
Coefficient on Tradable Input (NPCI), the Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC), the Profitability
Coefficient (PC), and the Subsidy to Producers (SP)
2.
3.3.1.Baseline Results
The PAM of cassava/maize production systems for each country is presented in tables A-16
through A-18 in the appendix. The policy-induced transfers (in the output and input markets) are
summarized in tables 6 and 7 below. Results from these two tables indicate that there are substantial
differences between countries in the magnitudes of public incentives offered to encourage
cassava/maize production systems. 
However, all countries display the same patterns. The baseline results indicated that, farmers
operating at the Bonoua markets near urban centers (i.e., Bonoua in Cote d’Ivoire, Koforidua in
Ghana and Abeokuta in Nigeria), benefited from a small implicit price support whereas farmers
operating in markets distant from urban centers (N’douci in Cote d’Ivoire, Kumasi in Ghana and
Onitsha in Nigeria) were subject a small implicit tax.
This is the result of farm-gate financial prices (15 fcfa in Cote d’Ivoire, 22 cedis in Ghana
and 0.57 nairas in Nigeria) for cassava root departing from the estimated import parity prices in each
                                                
2 DRC= domestic factors in social prices/ (revenues in social prices – tradable inputs in social prices), NPCO = revenues
in private prices / revenues in social prices, NPCI= tradable inputs in private prices/ tradable inputs in social prices, EPC=
(revenues in private prices –tradable inputs in private prices)/ (revenues in social prices –tradable inputs in social prices),
PC= private profits/ social profits, SP= (private profits- social profits)/ revenues in social prices.14
country (tables A-7 through A-9b in the appendix) depending on the point of sale.
It should be emphasized that these differentials are relatively small. With this in mind, here
are some plausible explanations of why market (financial) prices and economic prices (import parity
prices) did not equal in markets close to port cities and markets distant from port cities. The
divergences between these two prices could be due to a combination of the effect of the food import
policies (i.e., ban on cereals import in Nigeria, rice import tariffs in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire) and
the effect of the overvaluation of each country’s local currency. The indirect effect of such food
import policies will be an increase in the financial price of cassava root relative to the economic
price in all the markets.  On the other hand, the currency overvaluation will have the effect of
lowering the financial price of tradables such as roots and transport in both markets.
However, the magnitude of the reduction in prices will be large in markets far away from
port cities and small in the ones close to port cities because the share of transport costs in the import
parity price is relatively large for N’douci, Kumassi and Onitsha (distant from port cities) and
relatively small for Bonoua, Koforidua and Abeokuta (close to port cities). Transportation costs thus
provide a natural protection to domestic producers who supply markets located far from the import
point.
Thus, the net effect is as follows: 1) in N’douci, Kumassi and Onitsha : an increase in the 
financial price of roots due to the import tariff and a relatively large decrease in the financial price
of roots due to the currency overvaluation (via its impact on tradable goods such as cassava and
transport costs); and 2) in for Bonoua, Koforidua and Abeokuta: an increase in the financial price of
roots due to the import tariff and a relatively small decrease in the financial price of roots due to the
currency overvaluation. 
.  It should be noted that the results from tables 6 and 7 are calculated using the weighted15
average of peak-season and off-peak season wage rate across cassava production zones. The off-
peak season rate is two third of the peak-season rate in Cote d’Ivoire, half of the peak-season rate in
Ghana and. half of the peak-season rate in Nigeria.
Table 6: Summary of the Net Effects (in US$ using Shadow Exchange Rates) of                
       Policy-Induced Transfers For Commercial Cassava/Maize Systems, by                












Bonoua 87.00 -5.00 -0.4 92.00
N’douci -36.00 -5.00 -0.4 -31.00
GHANA
Koforidua 129.00 -7.00 -1.00 137.00
Kumassi -25.00 -7.00 -1.00 -17.00
NIGERIA
Abeokuta 187.00 -16.00 -1.00 205.00
Onitsha -24.00 -16.00 -1.00 -95.00
Source: tables A-16, A-17 and A-18 in the appendix.
Table 7:  Summary of the Net Effects of Policy-Induced Transfers For Commercial          












Impmech 119.00 -23.00 -2.00 143.00
Locmech 120.00 -16.00 -1.00 137.00
Locman 187.00 -16.00 -1.00 205.00
Impman 467.00 -23.00 -2.00 492.00
Onitsha
Impmech -289.00 -21.00 -2.00 -266.00
Locmech -108.00 -15.00 -1.00 -91.00
Locman -24.00 -15.00 -1.00 -7.00
Impman 177.00 -21.00 -2.00 200.00
Source: table A-16 in the appendix.
As for the tradable inputs and domestic factor transfers, they are negative everywhere.
However, it should be noted that these transfers are relatively smaller compared with the transfers
occurring in the outputs markets. The reason is that while the output (cassava roots) is assumed to
be tradable, only 20 percent of the inputs (e.g., local transportation) used in its production process is16
treated as such. The key difference is that, compared with a nontradable commodity or resource, the
domestic price formation of tradable commodity or resource is influenced to greater extent by the
world market for that commodity or resource.
Thus, results in table 6 imply that, when outputs and inputs were valued at their social
(efficiency) prices, the effect of government policy was: a) some type of support system to both
cassava/maize systems in regional output markets closer capital cities, a tax to cassava/maize
farmers selling at remote regional output markets; b) the provision of a subsidy, through an
overvalued exchange rate, on sale of all inputs (imported and produced domestically). 
Within Nigeria, some generalizations can be made concerning policy-induced transfers of
different technology combinations. Results in table 7 suggest that when outputs and inputs were
valued at their social (efficiency) prices, the effect of government policy was: 1) some support to
cassava/maize systems under each technology combination at the Abeokuta market and 2) some tax
on systems at the Onitsha market, except for systems under “Impman” combination. It is worth
noting that the largest amount of negative transfers to producers occurs under the “Impmech”
combination. In other words, farmers growing improved cassava varieties and producing gari using
modern technology have been taxed more compared to other cassava/maize farmers. This difference
can be explained as follows:  COSCA data indicate that the average farm-gate market price for
cassava root was 0.57 nairas in Nigeria during the survey period. This price departs from the
estimated import parity prices under each technology (tables A-9a and A-9b in the appendix) of
roots when Abeokuta or Onitsha is used as a point of sale. As already discussed above, overvalued
large transportation costs combined with the cereals imports ban of 1985 explain this difference.
The calculation of domestic resource cost (DRC) coefficients for different countries permits
a ranking of relative efficiencies in production. For example, given a desire to expand cassava/maize17
production systems in West Africa, the country with the lowest DRC is the most efficient avenue for
expansion. Thus, DRC rankings indicate which country can expect the highest social rate return on
its investment in farm and post farm technologies. Two main types of prices policy instruments can
be used to alter prices of agricultural outputs and inputs. Quotas tariffs, or subsidies on imports and
quotas, taxes, or subsidies on exports directly decrease or increase amounts traded internationally
and thus raise or lower domestic prices. Domestic taxes or subsidies, in contrast, create transfers
between the government treasury and domestic producers or consumers.
In addition to price and macro policies, governments influence their agricultural sectors
through public investment policy. Government budgetary resources can be invested in agriculture to
increase productivity and reduce costs ( Monke and Pearson, 1989).
Table 8: Ratio Indicators for Commercial Cassava/Maize, by Country: 1989-1991.
Countries/
Regional Output Mkets
DRC NPCO NPCI EPC PC SP
COTE D’IVOIRE    Bonoua 0.86 1.14 1.00 1.15 2.14 0.15
                                  N’douci 0.74 0.95 1.00 0.96 0.83 -0.04
GHANA                    Koforidua 0.81 1.12 0.67 1.13 1.71 0.13
                                  Kumassi 0.73 0.98 0.67 0.98 0.95 -0.01
NIGERIA                 Abeokuta 0.84 1.24 0.77 1.28 2.81 0.26
                                  Onitsha 0.71 0.98 0.77 0.99 0.97 -0.01
 Source: PAM Model constructed by the authors
Table 9: Ratio Indicators for Commercial Cassava/Maize Production Systems Under
Alternative Production and Processing Combinations and by distance in Nigeria, 1989-1991.
Mkts/Tech. Comb. DRC NPCO NPCI EPC PC SP
Abeokuta
Impmech 0.71 1.11 0.77 1.14 1.49 0.13
Locmech 0.77 1.14 0.77 1.17 1.76 0.16
Locman 0.84 1.24 0.77 1.28 2.81 0.26
Impman 1.09 1.64 0.77 1.77 -7.39 0.67
Onitsha
Impmech 0.50 0.80 0.77 0.80 0.61 -0.81
Locmech 0.65 0.90 0.77 0.91 0.74 -0.09
Locman 0.71 0.98 0.77 0.99 0.97 -0.01
Impman 0.76 1.18 0.77 1.22 1.91 0.20
Source: PAM Model constructed by the authors
Note: DRC= Domestic Resource Cost, NPCO= Nominal Protection Coefficient on                   
Tradable Output, NPCI= Nominal Protection Coefficient on Tradable Input, EPC= Effective
Protection Coefficient, PC= Profitability Coefficient and SP= Subsidy to Producers18
The DRC coefficients presented in table 8 clearly show that, not only they are less than unity
in all three countries, but also the three countries have similar comparative advantage in
cassava/maize production in West Africa using local varieties. DRC coefficients taken from the
essay on Nigeria are presented in table 9 to push the efficiency comparisons further. They indicate
that, cassava/maize systems under the “Impmech” technology have a greater comparative advantage
when outputs are sold in Onitsha.           Given that governments in West Africa are involved
extensively in their agriculture economies, it is of interest to describe how overvalued exchange rate
policies create private incentives. An overvalued exchange rate is an implicit tax on producers of
tradable products because too little domestic currency is earned by exports or paid out for imports.
In the absence of commodity price policy, the world price of a tradable good determines its domestic
price. When the exchange rate is overvalued, the domestic price is lower than its efficiency level
and domestic producers are effectively taxed.
  To examine the relationships between government policy and the cassava/maize economy in
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, policy-impact ratios, which cancel all units of measure, were
calculated. These ratios are presented in the tables 8 and 9 above. The analysis that follows will
focus on the NPCO, the NPCI and the EPC.
Of the three countries, Cote d’Ivoire demonstrates the lowest level of government
interference on both the input and the output sides in N’douci, a market located farther away from
the capital city. The NPCO, the EPC and the NPCI all are close to unity unity. In all three countries,
the NPCO and the EPC assume the same patterns in markets located closer to capital cities: they are
greater than unity, suggesting a certain positive protection to cassava/maize farmers in those
markets. However, in Ghana and Nigeria the NPCI are less than unity everywhere, implying
government policies in those countries have permitted inputs prices to be lower than they would be19
under open trade.
3.3.2. Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis carried out in this sub-section aims to test the robustness of the
results under the baseline scenario. Two scenarios are considered: the first scenario simulates a
change in yields of cassava and a change in processing costs; and the second considers the effects of
change in the shadow exchange rate.
Yields and Processing Cost. This sensitivity analysis is broken into two parts: the first part
investigates the effects of an increase in cassava yields in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana on the DRC
ratios. It is assumed that farmers in both countries have adopted the IITA variety; therefore cassava
yields equal ITTA variety yields in Nigeria (19,210 kilograms of roots per hectare).
Post-farm budgets analyses (tables 2 and 3) show that mechanized processing technology
decreases processing cost by 6 percent for farmers who grow local landrace cassava varieties,
varieties that are common to all three countries. Therefore, in the second part of the sensitivity
analysis, the impact of a decrease in processing costs is considered. The results are shown in table
10.
Table 10: Effects of Changes in Cassava Yields and Processing Costs on the DRC
 for  Root Production in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana:  1989/1991
Countries/
Markets
Effects of Increase  (79% for CI
and 43% for Ghana) in Cassava
Yields








Bonoua 0.86 -0.60 0.46 0.86 -1.94 0.76
N’douci 0.74 -0.57 0.41 0.74 -1.58 0.67
GHANA
Koforidua 0.81 -0.57 0.61 0.81 -2.26 0.70
Kumassi 0.74 -0.63 0.54 0.74 -1.80 0.66
Source: PAM Model constructed by the authors20
To help in assessing comparative costs across the three countries, DRC elasticties were
calculated. They are defined as the percentage change in DRC divided by percentage change in yield
or processing costs. Results of table 10 show that DRC elasticity values with respect to yields and
processing cost range from -0.57 to -0.60 and from -1.58 to -2.26 in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana,
respectively. The larger the value of the elasticity, the more effect the relevant parameter has on the
DRC coefficient. However, the question is how much it costs get a 1 percent change in yield versus
a 1 percent in processing cost in order to evaluate whether it would be better to invest in yields or
processing method.
Shadow Exchange Rates. The sensitivity analysis undertaken here is designed to examine the
effects of an appreciation of the real exchange rate on net social profitabilities (NSP) and selected
policy-indicators (DRC and EPC) ratios. Previous studies (Babo, 1996; Barry, 1998; and Nweke,
1998) have shown that market prices in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria have changed with a
decline in the shadow exchange rate, which led to recent currency devaluation in all three countries.
Therefore, these post-devaluation prices were used in carrying out this analysis. Tables 11 and 12
present the results.
Table 11: Effects of Change in the Shadow Exchange Rate on the Net Social Profit            
       (NSP in $US using Shadow exchange rates), by Country: 1989/1991
Countries/Regional Mkts Baseline Simulation Profit Elasticity
COTE D’IVOIRE                     Bonoua 81.06 266.84 6.55
N’douci1 84.60 329.942 .25
GHANA Koforidua 192.55 -152.45 -0.85
Kumassi 311.83 -250.63 -0.86
NIGERIA Abeokuta 113.00 18.44 -0.29
Onitsha 261.50 19.65 -0.32
Source: PAM Model constructed by the authors
Note: it is assumed that the percentage changes in the equilibrium exchange rates are: 35% for Cote
d’Ivoire, 210% for Ghana and 280% for Nigeria.21
Table 12: Effects of Change in the Shadow Exchange Rate on Selected Policy Indicators,
by Country: 1989/1991
Countries/Mkts Policy Indicators
DRC Ratio EPC Ratio
Baseline % Change Simulatio
n
Baseline % Change Simulation
COTE D’IVOIRE
Bonoua 0.86 -25 0.64 1.15 -32 0.78
N’douci 0.74 -20 0.59 0.96 -28 0.70
GHANA
Koforidua 0.81 62 1.31 1.71 -18 1.40
Kumassi 0.73 119 1.60 0.97 64 1.59
NIGERIA
Abeokuta 0.84 17 0.98 1.28 -50 0.64
Onitsha 0.71 37 0.97 0.99 -36 0.63
Source: PAM Model constructed by the authors
Note: it is assumed that the percentage changes in the equilibrium exchange rates are:35% for Cote
d’Ivoire, 210% for Ghana and 280% for Nigeria.
As the profit elasticities
 in table 10 indicate, social profitability levels are very sensitive to
changes in the shadow exchange rates. Following 35 percent, 210 percent and 286 percent decline in
the equilibrium exchange rate in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria respectively, results from table
11 show that, while cassava/maize systems show considerable benefit from the exchange rate
depreciation in Cote d’Ivoire, systems in Ghana suffered a huge loss. This result can be explained by
the fact that in Ghana, farm level wage rates rose from 1000 cedis to 4000 cedis (a 300 percent
increase) while output price rose from 22 cedis to 65cedis (a 195 percent increase).
The results of table 12 show the effect of changes in the exchange rates on the DRC, the
EPC. The simulated values of the domestic resource cost (DRC) ratios are greater than unity in
Ghana, suggesting that the decrease in the equilibrium exchange rate combined with the increased
valued of domestic labor have caused that country to suffer a comparative disadvantage. However,
the EPC estimates are also greater unity, suggesting that farmers are receiving positive protection.22
That is, they could have received a lower return if they faced border prices instead of domestic
prices on both outputs and inputs.
4. Conclusions
This paper is an application of the policy analysis matrix (PAM) for cassava/maize
production systems in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria. The purpose was to analyze and compare
the competitiveness of cassava/maize systems in these three West African countries. The baseline
results compared in this study demonstrate the narrow range of efficiencies of production. All three
countries have almost similar comparative advantage in cassava/maize production systems, although
labor input for Nigeria and Ghana is 15 to 30 percent higher than for Cote d’Ivoire.
However, PAM is a static model which cannot capture changes in prices and productivity
(Yao, 1998); therefore, a sensitivity analysis was carried out. The simulation findings indicate that,
in most instances, the decline in the equilibrium exchange rate has allowed the differences in
efficiencies across countries to be maintained.
The results of this study have several implications for the three West African countries’ goal
of reaching regional self-sufficiency in food crops in West Africa. First, all cassava/maize systems
under existing techniques are financially and socially profitable if the output substitutes for imports
on-farm or in markets near the site of production. Second, the extent of divergences (especially for
tradable inputs and factor prices) observed in the three countries is relatively small (see tables A-16
through A-18 in the appendix); therefore, there is little scope for achieving easy improvements by
removing significant price distortions.
Third, the simulation results indicate that the potential for governments to assist in income
growth lies in areas other than commodity market price policy. In Nigeria and Ghana, protectionism
can be viewed as an expression of an inward-looking import-substitution strategy. Thus, the23
realization of income gains for cassava/maize farmers in Nigeria and Ghana depended in the 1980s
and the early 1990s on a change in foreign exchange rate policy.
In Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, simulation results indicate that cassava/maize farmers could
benefit from growing   IITA’s variety and adopting mechanized processing methods. Baseline
results for Nigeria clearly indicate that the Impmech technology combination reduces labor costs,
which is good in case of labor constraints. The profitability of cassava/maize systems will encourage
their expansion and the reduction of the area planted. One option is to invest in research and
development programs that would facilitate the adoption of the ITTA’s variety and mechanized
processing methods.24
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APPENDIX26
CORN EARS YIELD ESTIMATION
The procedure used is the “Ear Weight Method”. It involved the following steps.
STEP 1. : Hand shells 30 dry corn ears and put the grains in 30 different plastic bags. Weigh each
bag and calculate the average weight of grains (in grams) on a cob. Then divide the result by 0.80,
assuming that grain is about 80% of ear weight, to obtain the average dry ear weight.
STEP 2. : Convert each country’s grain production from tons to grams and divide the result by 0.80,
assuming that grain is about 80% of ear weight, to obtain the total dry ear weight.
STEP 3. : Divide the results obtained in the first two steps by 0.65 (assuming a wet corn with 35%
moisture content) to get the average fresh on the field corn weight and the total fresh on the field
corn weight for each country.
STEP 4.: Divide the total fresh on the field corn weight for each country by the average fresh on the
field corn weight and to get the total number of corn ears for each country.
EXAMPLE: the case of Cote d’Ivoire
1) The average weight of grains on a cob was 145.08 grams.
 The average dry ear weight was 181.35 grams (145.08/0.80)
2) The average grain production per hectare was 983628 grams and the total dry ear weight was
1229534.86 grams
3) The average fresh on the field corn weight was 279 grams (181.35/ .65) and the total fresh on the
field corn weight for the country was 1891592.10 grams (1229534.86/0.65).
4) The total fresh on the field corn weight divided  by the average fresh on the field corn weight
gave the total number of corn ears of 6779.9 ears rounded off to 6780 ears.27
Table A-1: Estimated Average Financial Budget for Cassava/Maize Production Systems,
 Cote d’Ivoire: 1989/1991




















Family/Hired Labor Use (person-days )
Land Clearing
Seedbed Preparation  
Weeding
Planting                                                                
            Cassava
            Maize
 Harvesting
           Cassava
            Maize
 Total                                                                          
2. OUTPUTS                                                                
Average Root Yield (kg/ha)                                                       
    Average Maize Yield (ears/ha)
3
Market Price of Root (fcfa/kg)
4
Market Price of Green Maize (fcfa/ears)
5
Revenues from Green Maize (fcfa/ha)






              Hired Labor
Transportation field-to-home (fcfa/ton)        
Interest on Working Capital (8%)
Total Operating Costs (fcfa/ha)
Family Labor (valued @ hired labor wage rate)
Opportunity Cost of land
4. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Gross Margin (fcfa/ha)
Net Returns to family Labor (fcfa/ha)
Net Returns per day of Family Labor (fcfa/day)
Total System Production Costs (fcfa/ha)




















                                                
3 Estimated using the “Ear Weight Method” discussed above. In West Africa, maize, which has a short cycle,
is harvested before cassava establishes. Hence competition between maize and cassava is minimized, while
sole plant density is maintained for both crops (COSCA Working Paper No.10, page 84).
4 Weighted average farmgate price based on COSCA data
5  Farmgate price based on personal communication with Centre Ivoirien de Recherches Economiques et
Sociales (CIRES).
6 Farmers did not purchase planting materials of food crops; they produced their own: for cassava, only one
fifth of the stems from previous harvest are retained for replanting and for maize, only 2 to 3 percent of the
harvest is retained for seed. Therefore, the opportunity cost of planting materials, which is relatively
insignificant, is not counted. 28
Source: COSCA survey data
Table A-2: Estimated Average Financial Budget for Cassava/Maize Production Systems,
Ghana: 1989/1991




















Family/Hired Labor Use (person-days)
Land Clearing
Seedbed Preparation  
Weeding
Planting                                                                
            Cassava
            Maize
 Harvesting
            Cassava
            Maize
  Total                                                                          
2. OUTPUTS                                                                              
    Average Root Yield (kg/ha)                                                     
       Average Maize Yield (ears/ha)
7
Market Price of Root (cedis/kg)
8
Market Price of Green Maize (cedis/ears)
9
Revenues from Green Maize (cedis/ha)






              Hired Labor
Transportation field-to-home (cedis/ton of roots)
              Interest on Working Capital (8%)
Total Operating Costs (cedis/ha)
Family Labor (valued @ hired labor wage rate)
Opportunity Cost of Land (cedis)
4. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Gross Margin (cedis/ha)
Net Returns to family Labor (cedis/ha)
Net Returns per day of Family Labor (cedis/day)
Total System Production Costs (cedis/ha)




















                                                
7 Estimated using the “Ear Weight Method” described earlier in the appendix. In West Africa, maize, which
has a short cycle, is harvested before cassava establishes. Hence competition between maize and cassava is
minimized, while sole plant density is maintained for both crops. (COSCA Working Paper No.10, page 84)
8 Weighted average farmgate price based on COSCA data
9 Farmgate price based on secondary source of information: the Dept. of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Accra, Ghana)
10 Farmers did not purchase planting materials of food crops; they produced their own: for cassava, only one
fifth of the stems from previous harvest is retained for replanting, and for maize only 2 to 3 percent of the
harvest is retained for seed. Therefore, the opportunity cost of planting materials, which is relatively
insignificant, is not counted. 29
Source: COSCA survey data
Table A-3:  Estimated Average Financial Budget for Cassava/Maize Systems
  For Local Landraces, Nigeria: 1989/1991




















Family/Hired Labor Use (person-days)
Land Clearing
Seedbed Preparation  
Weeding
Planting                                                                
            Cassava
            Maize
 Harvesting
            Cassava
            Maize
 Total                                                                          
2. OUTPUTS                                                                       
 Average Root Yield (kg/ha)                                                 
    Average Maize Yield (ears/ha)
11
Market Price of Root (nairas/kg)
12
Market Price of Green Maize (nairas/ears)
13
Revenues from Green Maize (nairas/ha)






              Hired Labor
Transportation  (nairas)            
Interest on Working Capital (8%)
Total Operating Costs (nairas/ha)
Family Labor (valued @ hired labor wage rate)
Opportunity Cost of land (nairas)
4. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Gross Margin (nairas/ha)
Net Returns to family Labor (nairas/ha)
Net Returns per day of Family Labor (nairas/day)
Total System Production Costs (nairas/ha)




















Source: COSCA survey data
                                                
11 Estimated using the “Ear Weight Method” discussed earlier in the appendix. In West Africa, maize, which
has a short cycle, is harvested before cassava establishes. Hence competition between maize and cassava is
minimized, while sole plant density is maintained for both crops. (COSCA Working Paper No.10, page 84)
12 Weighted average farmgate price based on COSCA data
13 Farmgate price based on secondary source of information (personal communication with IITA)
14 Farmers did not purchase planting materials of food crops; they produced their own: for cassava, only one
fifth of the stems from previous harvest are retained for replanting and for maize, only 2 to 3 percent of
harvest is used for seed. Therefore, the opportunity cost of planting materials, which is relatively insignificant,
is not counted.30
Table A-4: Estimated Average Financial Budget per hectare for Attieke Production
15 in
Cote d’Ivoire, 1989-1991, assuming that 45% of roots production goes into attieke production
Budget Items
1. INPUT USE
Family/Hired Labor Use (person-days)
16                              
Raw Material (kgs of roots)
17                                           
2. OUTPUTS                                                                            
    Transformation Rate                                                              
       Kilograms of Processed Output per ha





              Hired Labor (persondays)
              Raw Material (roots)20
              Bagging Materials
              Firewood
              Transportation21
              Interest on Working Capital (8%)
Total Operating Costs (fcfa/ha)
Family Labor (valued @ hired labor wage rate) (fcfa/ha)
4. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Gross Margin (fcfa/ha)
Net Returns to family Labor (fcfa/ha)
Net Returns per day of Family Labor (fcfa/day)
Total production Costs (fcfa/ha)
Net Enterprise Profits (fcfa/ha)
Production Costs per Kg of attieke (fcfa/kg)
Family      Hired





















                                                
15 There were forty-three (43) farmers using traditional techniques versus three (3) using modern techniques.
Therefore, this budget includes only farmers using traditional (manual) processing techniques.
16 This item includes labor for Peeling, Washing, Grating. Pressing, Sieving and Steaming.
17 This represents 45% of the average root yield per hectare (page 23 in COSCA Working Paper No 6)
18 Weighted average village market price estimated from COSCA data
19 No mechanical equipment was used in any processing activity. Grating was performed manually (COSCA
Working Paper No.14, page 15).
20 Valued at its opportunity cost which is the weighted average farmgate price computed from the COSCA
data
21 This item includes home-to-market transportation costs only.31
Table A-5:  Estimated Average Financial Budget per hectare for Gari Production
22
in Ghana, 1989-1991, assuming that 50% of roots production goes into gari production
Budget Items                                                     
Family    Hired
32           19
6521
1. INPUT USE
Family/Hired Labor Use (person-days)
23
Raw Material (kgs of roots)
24
2. OUTPUTS                                                                                      
     Transformation Rate                                                                       
         Kilograms of Processed Output per ha







              Hired Labor (persondays)
              Bagging Materials
              Raw Material (roots)
27
              Firewood
              Transportation
28
              Interest on Working Capital (8%)
Total Operating Costs (cedis/ha)
 Family Labor (valued @ hired labor wage rate) (cedis/ha)
4. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Gross Margin (cedis/ha)
Net Returns to family Labor (cedis/ha)
Net Returns per day of Family Labor (cedis/day)
Average Total production Costs (cedis/ha)
Net Enterprise Profits (cedis/ha)





















                                                
22 There were thirty-six (36) farmers using traditional techniques versus six (6) farmers using modern
techniques. Therefore, this budget includes only farmers using traditional (manual) processing techniques.
23 This item includes labor for peeling, washing, grating, pressing, sieving and roasting.
24 This represents 50% of the average root yield per hectare (see page 23 in COSCA Working Paper No 6)
25 Weighted average village market price estimated from COSCA data
26 No mechanical equipment was used in any processing activity. Grating was performed manually (COSCA
Working Paper No.14, page 15)
27Valued at its opportunity cost which is the weighted average farmgate price computed from the COSCA
data.
28 This item includes home-to-market transportation costs only.32
Table A-6: Estimated Average Financial Budget per hectare for Gari Production under
Technology Combination “LOCMAN”29, Nigeria, 1989/1991, assuming 80% root
production goes into gari production.
Budget Items                                                     
1. INPUT USE
Family/Hired Labor Use (person-days)
30
Raw Material (kgs of roots)
31
2. OUTPUTS                                                                               
     Transformation Rate                                                                 
        Kilograms of Processed Output per ha







              Hired Labor (person-days)
              Raw material
34
              Bagging Materials
              Firewood
              Transportation
35
              Interest on Working Capital (8%)
Total Operating Costs (nairas/ha)
Family Labor (valued @ hired labor wage rate) (nairas/ha)
4.PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Gross Margin (nairas/ha)
Net Returns to family Labor (nairas/ha)
Net Returns per day of Family Labor (nairas/day)
Total production Costs (nairas/ha)
Net Enterprise Profits (nairas/ha)
Production Costs per Kg of gari (nairas/kg)
Family    Hired






















                                                
29 Local variety and manual Processing
30 This item includes labor for washing, cleaning, grating, pressing sieving and roasting.
31 This represents 80% of  the average root yield per hectare (see page 128 in COSCA Working Paper No.20)
32 Weighted average village market price estimated from COSCA data
33 No mechanical equipment was used in any processing activity. Grating was done manually ( COSCA
Working Paper No.14, page 15)
34 Valued at its opportunity cost, which is the weighted average farmgate, price computed from the COSCA
data.
35 This item includes home-to-market transportation costs only.33
Table A-7: Economic Import Parity Price of Cassava Root
  For Sale in Regional Output Markets, Ghana: 1989/1991.
Regional Output Markets Items
Koforidua Kumassi
1. World Price (FOB-$US/mt tapioca)
2. Freight and insurance ($US/mt tapioca)
3. CIF, port in Accra ( $US/mt tapioca)  (1+2)
4. Shadow Exchange rate (cedis / $US)
5. CIF price at the port in Accra ( cedis/mt tapioca) (3*4)
6. Domestic costs  (cedis/mt tapioca)
     a.  Port charges  (cedis/mt tapioca)
     b. Transit and Transport (cedis/mt tapioca)
     c.  Storage and Handling (cedis/mt tapioca)
7. Accra gate price (5+ 6a…c ) (cedis/mt tapioca)
 8. Importer marketing margin (%)
9. Wholesale price in Accra (7* (1+ 8))
10. Accra to Regional Market Center
       a   Distance (km)
       b. Transport cost (cedis/mt tapioca)
       c.  Handling (cedis/mt tapioca)
11. Regional Market Center (Reference Price)
     Farmgate price (cedis/mt tapioca) (9 + 10a..c )
12. Wholesale marketing margin (%)
13. Wholesale price
       in Regional  Market (cedis/mt tapioca) (11* (1+12))
14. Regional Market Center to Village
         a.  Distance (kms)
         b. Transport and Handling cost (cedis/mt tapioca)
15. Village gate price (cedis/mt tapioca)   (13-14b)
 16.  Semi-wholesale marketing margin (%) 
17.  Village Level Semi-wholesale price ((1-16)*15)/1000
18.Transformation rate (kg of tapioca / kg of root)
19. Processing cost (cedis/kg of root)




















































Source:  COSCA data, Ghana Yearly Statistical Digests (1989-1991), Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific, Reports of 1989 through 1991.34
Table A-8: Economic Import Parity Price of Cassava Root
For Sale in Regional Output Markets, Cote d’Ivoire: 1989/1991
Regional Output Markets Items
Bonoua N’douci
1. World Price (FOB-$US/mt tapioca)
2. Freight and insurance ($US/mt tapioca)
3. CIF, port in Abidjan ($US/mt tapioca)  (1+2)
4. Shadow Exchange rate (fcfa / $US)
5. CIF price at the port in Abidjan ( fcfa/mt tapioca)
(3*4)
6. Domestic costs  (fcfa/mt tapioca)
     a.  Port charges  (fcfa/mt tapioca)
     b. Transit and Transport (fcfa/mt tapioca)
     c.  Storage and Handling (fcfa/mt tapioca)
7. Abidjan gate price (5+ 6a…c ) (fcfa/mt tapioca)
8. Importer marketing margin (%)
9. Wholesale price in Abidjan (7* (1+ 8))
10. Abidjan to Regional Market Center
       a   Distance (km)
       b. Transport cost (fcfa/mt tapioca)
       c.  Handling (fcfa/mt tapioca)
11. Regional Market Center (Reference Price)
     Farmgate price (fcfa/mt tapioca) (9 + 10a..c)
12. Wholesale marketing margin (%)
13. Wholesale price
       in Regional  Market ( fcfa/mt tapioca) (11* (1+12))
14. Regional Market Center to Village
         a.  Distance (kms)
         b. Transport and Handling cost (fcfa/mt tapioca)
15. Village gate price  (fcfa/mt tapioca)   (13-14b)
16. Semi-wholesale marketing margin (%) 
17. Village Level Semi-wholesale price
(1-16)*15)/1000
18.Transformation rate (kg of tapioca / kg of root)
19. Processing cost (fcfa/kg of root)




















































Source: COSCA data, Institut de Documentaion de Recherches et d’Etudes Maritimes of the Ivorian Marine
Ministry; UN Economic and Social Commission For Asia and the Pacific, Reports of 1989 through 1991.35
Table A-9a: Economic Import Parity Price of Cassava Root, by Alternative Technology
Combinations. For Sale in the Regional Output Market of Abeokuta, Nigeria: 1989/1991.
Regional Output  Market
Abeokuta
Items
Impmech Locmech Locman Impman
1. World Price (FOB-$US/mt tapioca)
2. Freight and insurance ($US/mt tapioca)
3. CIF, port in Lagos ( $US/mt tapioca)  (1+2)
4. Shadow Exchange rate ( nairas / $US)
5. CIF price at the port in Lagos ( nairas/mt tapioca)
(3*4)
6. Domestic costs  (nairas/mt tapioca)
a.  Port charges  (nairas/mt tapioca)
 b. Transit and Transport (nairas/mt tapioca)
 c. Storage and Handling (nairas/mt tapioca)
7. Lagos gate price (5+ 6a…c ) (nairas/mt tapioca)
 8. Importer marketing margin (%)
9. Wholesale price in Lagos (7* (1+ 8))
10. Lagos to Regional Market Center
 a   Distance (km)
 b. Transport cost (nairas/mt tapioca)
 c.  Handling (nairas/mt tapioca)
11. Regional Market Center (Reference Price)
 Farmgate price (nairas/mt tapioca) (9 +10a..c)
12. Wholesale marketing margin (%)
13. Wholesale price in Regional Market    
(nairas/mt tapioca) (11* (1+12))
14. Regional Market Center to Village
  a.  Distance (kms)
   b. Transport and Handling cost (nairas/mt
tapioca)
15. Village gate price   (nairas/mt tapioca)   (13-
14b)
16.  Semi-wholesale marketing margin (%) 
17.  Village Level Semi-wholesale price
(1-16)*15)/1000
18.Transformation rate (kg of tap./ kg of  root)
19. Processing cost (nairas/kg of root)
20. Import Parity Price in the Village (nairas /kg of





































































































Source: COSCA data, UNCTAD’s Review of Maritime Transport 1989-1992, Nigerian Port Authority
Statistical Reports 1989-1992, UN Economic and Social Commission For Asia and the Pacific, Reports of
1989 through 1991.36
Table A-9b: Economic Import Parity Price of Cassava Root, by Alternative Technology




Impmech Locmech Locman Impman
1. World Price ( FOB-$US/mt tapioca)
2. Freight and insurance ($US/mt tapioca)
3. CIF, port in Lagos ( $US/mt tapioca)  (1+2)
4. Shadow Exchange rate ( nairas / $US)
5. CIF price at the port in Lagos (3*4)
6. Domestic costs  (nairas/mt tapioca)
  a. Port charges  (nairas/mt tapioca)
  b.Transit and Transport (nairas/mt tapioca)
  c. Storage and Handling (nairas/mt tapioca)
7.Lagos gate price (5+ 6a.c)(nairas/mt tapioca)
8. Importer marketing margin (%)
9. Wholesale price in Lagos (7* (1+ 8))
10. Lagos to Regional Market Center
   a   Distance (km)
   b. Transport cost (nairas/mt tapioca)
   c.  Handling (nairas/mt tapioca)
11. Regional Market Center (Reference Price)
Farmgate price(nairas/mt tapioca) (9 + 10a..c)
12. Wholesale marketing margin (%)
13. Wholesale price in Regional Market 
(nairas/mt tapioca) (11* (1+12))
14.Regional Market Center to Village
   a.  Distance (kms)
   b. Transport and Handling cost (nairas/mt
tapioca)
15.Village gate price (nairas/mt tapioca)13-14b)
 16.  Semi-wholesale marketing margin (%) 
17.Village Level Semi-wholesale price((1-16 
)*15)/1000
18.Transformation rate (kg tap./ kg of  root)
19. Processing cost (nairas/kg of root)
20. Import Parity Price in the Village (nairas /kg of





































































































Source: COSCA data, UNCTAD’s Review of Maritime Transport 1989-1992, Nigerian Port Authority
Statistical Reports (1989-1992), UN Economic and Social Commission For Asia and the Pacific, Reports of
1989 through 1991.37
Table A-10:  Estimated Economic Farm Level Budget for Commercial Cassava/Maize Production
Systems, by Regional Output Markets, Ghana, 1989/1991
Budget Items                                                      Regional Output Markets
Koforidua Kumassi
1. OUTPUTS                                                                 
   Average Root Yield (kg/ha)                                        
       Average Green Maize Yield (ears/ha)
36
Market Price of root (cedis/kg)
37
Market Price of Green Maize (cedis/ear)
38
Revenues from Root (cedis /ha)
Revenues from Green Maize (cedis /ha)





            Hired Labor
40
           Transportation (cedis/ton)
                    Tradable
                    Nontradable
            Interest on Working Capital (8%)
Total Operating Costs (cedis /ha)
Family Labor (@ hired labor wage rate) (cedis /ha)
Opportunity Cost of Land41 (cedis/ha)
3. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Gross Margin (cedis /ha)
Net Returns to family Labor (cedis /ha)
Net Returns per day of Family Labor (cedis /day)
Total production Costs (cedis /ha)









































Source: COSCA survey data
                                                
36 Estimated Farmgate price using the “Ear Weight Method” earlier in the appendix.
37 Estimated farm level import parity price of root.
38 Farmgate price based on secondary source of information: the Dept. of Planning, Monitoring and
Evaluation (Ministry of food and Agriculture, Accra, Ghana).
39 Farmers did not purchase planting materials of food crops; they produced their own: for cassava, only one
fifth of the stems from previous harvest is retained for replanting and for maize, only 2 to 3 percent of the
harvest is retained for seed. Therefore, the opportunity cost of planting materials, which is relatively
insignificant, is not counted.
40 Although rural labor markets in West Africa are complex, it is reasonable to assume that market wages offer
good approximations to shadow wages (Humphreys in Rice in West Africa, p. 80, 1981).
41 Land is very rarely sold or rented. In this budget, the opportunity cost of land is estimated as the net return
to land that farmers would enjoy if they produced green maize only.38
TableA-11:  Estimated Financial Farm Level Budget for Commercial Cassava/Maize Production
Systems, by Regional Output Markets, Ghana, 1989/1991
Budget Items                                                      Regional Output Markets
Koforidua Kumassi
1. OUTPUTS                                                                  
    Average Root Yield (kg/ha)                                         
       Average Green Maize Yield (ears/ha)
42
Market Price of root (cedis/kg)
43
Market Price of Green Maize (cedis/ear)
44
Revenues from Root (cedis /ha)
Revenues from Green Maize (cedis /ha)





            Hired Labor
46
           Transportation (cedis/ton)
                   Tradable
                    Nontradable
           Interest on Working Capital (8%)
Total Operating Costs (cedis /ha)
Family Labor (@ hired labor wage rate) (cedis /ha)
Opportunity Cost of Land
47 (cedis/ha)
3. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Gross Margin (cedis /ha)
Net Returns to family Labor (cedis /ha)
Net Returns per day of Family Labor (cedis /day)
Total production Costs (cedis /ha)









































Source: COSCA survey data
                                                
42 Estimated Farmgate price using the “Ear Weight Method” discussed earlier in the appendix.
43 Weigthed average farmgate price based on COSCA data.
44 Farmgate price based on secondary source of information: the Dept. of Planning, Monitoring and
Evaluation (Ministry of food and Agriculture, Accra, Ghana).
45 Farmers did not purchase planting materials of food crops; they produced their own: for cassava, only one
fifth of the stems from previous harvest per hectare and for maize only 1 to 2 percent of harvest. Therefore,
the opportunity cost of planting materials, which is relatively insignificant, is not counted.
46 Given that available labor in West African rural areas are mostly unskilled, it is assumed that financial labor
cost per day reflects the economic cost of labor.
47 Land is very rarely sold or rented. In this budget, the opportunity cost of land is estimated as the return to
land that farmers would enjoy if they produced green maize only.39
Table A-12: Estimated Economic Farm Level Budget for Commercial Cassava/Maize Production
Systems, by Regional Output Markets, Cote d’Ivoire, 1989-1991
Budget Items                                                      Regional Output
Markets
Bonoua N’douci
1. OUTPUTS                                                                            
     Average Root Yield (kg/ha)                                                  
         Average Green Maize Yield (ears/ha)
48
Market Price of root (fcfa/kg)
49
Market Price of Green Maize (fcfa/ear)
50
Revenues from Root (fcfa /ha)
Revenues from Green Maize (fcfa /ha)





              Hired Labor
52
              Transportation field-to-home (fcfa)
                              Tradable
                               Nontradable
              Interest on Working Capital (8%)
Total Operating Costs (fcfa /ha)
Family Labor (valued @ hired labor wage rate) (fcfa /ha)
Opportunity Cost of Land
53 (fcfa/ha)
3. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Gross Margin (fcfa /ha)
Net Returns to family Labor (fcfa /ha)
Net Returns per day of Family Labor (fcfa /day)
Total production Costs (fcfa /ha)









































Source: COSCA survey data
                                                
48 Estimated Farmgate price using the “Ear Weight Method” discussed earlier in the appendix.
49 Estimated farm level import parity price of root
50 Farmgate price based on personal communication with Centre Ivoirien de Recherches Economiques et
Sociales (CIRES).
51Farmers did not purchase planting materials of food crops; they produced their own: for cassava, only one
fifth of the stems from previous harvest is retained for replanting and for maize, only 2 to 3 percent of  the
harvest is retained for seed. Therefore, the opportunity cost of planting materials, which is relatively
insignificant, is not counted
52 Although rural labor markets in West Africa are complex, it is reasonable to assume that market wages offer
good approximations to shadow wages (Humphreys in Rice in West Africa, p. 80, 1981).
53 Land is very rarely sold or rented. In this budget, the opportunity cost of land is estimated as the net return
to land that farmers would enjoy if they produced green maize only.40
Table A-13: Estimated Financial Farm Level Budget for Commercial Cassava/Maize
Production Systems, by Regional Output Markets, Cote d’Ivoire, 1989-1991
Budget Items                                                      Regional Output
Markets
Bonoua N’douci
1. OUTPUTS                                                                            
    Average Root Yield (kg/ha)                                                   
        Average Green Maize Yield (ears/ha)
54
Market Price of root (fcfa/kg)
55
Market Price of Green Maize (fcfa/ear)
56
Revenues from Root (fcfa /ha)
Revenues from Green Maize (fcfa /ha)





              Hired Labor
              Transportation (fcfa)
                       Tradable
                       Nontradable
             Interest on Working Capital (8%)
Total Operating Costs (fcfa /ha)
Family Labor (valued @ hired labor wage rate) (fcfa /ha)
Opportunity Cost of Land
58 (fcfa/ha)
3. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Gross Margin (fcfa /ha)
Net Returns to family Labor (fcfa /ha)
Net Returns per day of Family Labor (fcfa /day)
Total production Costs (fcfa /ha)









































Source: COSCA survey data
                                                
54 Estimated Farmgate price using the “Ear Weight Method” discussed earlier in the appendix.
55 Weighted average farmgate price based on COSCA data.
56 Farmgate price based on personal communication with Centre Ivoirien de Recherches Economiques et
Sociales (CIRES).
57 Farmers did not purchase planting materials of food crops; they produced their own: for cassava, only one
fifth of the stems from previous harvest is retained for replanting and for maize, only 2 to 3 percent of harvest.
Therefore, the opportunity cost of planting materials, which is relatively insignificant, is not counted. 
58 Land is very rarely sold or rented. In this budget, the opportunity cost of land is estimated as the net return
to land that farmers would enjoy if they produced green maize only.41
Table A-14: Estimated Economic Budget for Commercial Cassava/Maize Systems under
Technology Combination “LOCMAN”
59, by Regional Output Markets, Nigeria,
1989/1991
Budget Items                                                      Regional Output Markets
Abeokuta Onitsha
1. OUTPUTS                                                         
    Average Root Yield (kg/ha)                               
      Average Green Maize Yield (ears/ha)
60
Market Price of root (nairas/kg)
61
Market Price of Green Maize (nairas/ear)
62
Revenues from Root (nairas /ha)
Revenues from Green Maize (nairas /ha)





              Hired Labor
64
              Transportation (nairas)
                       Tradable
                       Nontradable
Interest on Working Capital (8%)
Total Operating Costs (nairas /ha)
Family Labor (@ hired labor wage rate) (nairas
/ha)
Opportunity Cost of Land
65 (nairas/ha)
3. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Gross Margin (nairas /ha)
Net Returns to family Labor (nairas /ha)
Net Returns per day of Family Labor (nairas /day)
Total production Costs (nairas /ha)









































Source: COSCA survey data
                                                
59 Local variety and manual processing 
60 Estimated using the “Ear Weight Method” discussed earlier in the appendix.
61 Estimated Farm Level Import Parity Price of root
62 Farmgate price based on secondary source of information (personal communication with IITA).
63Farmers did not purchase planting materials of food crops but produced their own: for cassava, only one fifth
of the stems from previous harvest are retained for replanting and for maize, only 2 to 3% of the previous
harvest is saved for seed. Therefore, the opportunity cost of planting materials, which is relatively
insignificant, is not counted.
64 Although rural labor markets in West Africa are complex, it is reasonable to assume that market wages offer
good approximations to shadow wages (Humphreys in Rice in West Africa, p. 80, 1981).
65 Land is very rarely sold or rented. In this budget, the opportunity cost of land is estimated as the Gross
Margin that farmers would enjoy if the produce green maize only.42
Table A-15: Estimated Financial Budget for Commercial Cassava/Maize Systems
 under Technology Combination “LOCMAN”
66, by Regional Output Markets,
 Nigeria, 1989/1991
Budget Items                                                      Regional Output Markets
Abeokuta Onitsha
1. OUTPUTS                                                                    
    Average Root Yield (kg/ha)                                           
       Average Green Maize Yield (ears/ha)
67
Market Price of root (nairas/kg)
68
Market Price of Green Maize (nairas/ear)
69
Revenues from Root (nairas /ha)
Revenues from Green Maize (nairas /ha)





              Hired Labor
              Transportation (nairas)
                       Tradable
                       Nontradable
             Interest on Working Capital (8%)
Total Operating Costs (nairas /ha)
Family Labor (@ hired labor wage rate) (nairas /ha)
Opportunity Cost of Land71 (nairas/ha)
3. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Gross Margin (nairas /ha)
Net Returns to family Labor (nairas /ha)
Net Returns per day of Family Labor (nairas /day)
Total production Costs (nairas /ha)









































Source: COSCA survey data
                                                
66 Local variety and manual processing 
67 Estimated using the “Ear Weight Method” discussed earlier in the appendix.
68 Weighted average farmgate price based on COSCA data.
69 Farmgate price based on secondary source of information (personal communication with IITA).
70Farmers did not purchase planting materials of food crops but produced their own: for cassava, only one fifth
of the stems from previous harvest are retained for replanting and for maize, only 2 to 3% of the previous
harvest is saved for seed. Therefore, the opportunity cost of planting materials, which is relatively
insignificant, is not counted.
71 Land is very rarely sold or rented. In this budget, the opportunity cost of land is estimated as the net return
to land that farmers would enjoy if the produce green maize only.43
Table A-16: Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) for Commercial Cassava/Maize Systems in Nigeria under
   Alternative production and processing combinations and by distance between output
markets and the village/farm: Net Financial Profitability (nairas /ha), Net Social
Profitability (nairas/ha), and Net Effects of Policy-Induced Transfers: 1989/1991.
Regional Output Markets
Abeokuta Onitsha












Financial Prices 26466 1666 15267 9532 25918 1594 15124 9200
Social Prices 23851 2166 15307 6378 32281 2064 15161 15055
Divergences 2614 -500 -40 3154 -6362 -470 -38 -5855
LOCMECH
Financial Prices 21453 1183 13279 6991 21133 1132 14399 5602
Social Prices 18823 1538 13307 3978 23500 1472 14426 7602
Divergences 2630 -355 -28 3013 -2367 -340 -27 -2000
LOCMAN
Financial Prices 21453 1183 13279 6991 21133 1132 14399 5602
Social Prices 17332 1538 13307 2486 21651 1472 14426 5753
Divergences 4121 -355 -28 4505 -518 -340 -27 -151
IMPMAN
Financial Prices 26466 1666 15267 9532 25918 1594 15124 9200
Social Prices 16184 2166 15307 -1289 22030 2064 15161 4805
Divergences 10282 -500 -40 10822 3888 -470 -38 4396
Source: 1) PAM Model constructed by the author but not shown due to space limitation;
              2) Tables A3-9 through A3-16.
Note: Divergences are calculated as financial prices minus economic prices44
Table A-17: Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) for Commercial Cassava/Maize Production Systems in
Ghana: Net Financial Profitability ($US /ha), Net Social Profitability ($US/ha),
Comparative Advantage and Net Effects of Policy-Induced Transfers, 1989-1991.
Regional Output Markets
Koforidua Kumassi









Financial Prices 1168 15 824 330 1146 14 83
Social Prices 1039 22 825 193 1171 21 83
Divergences 129 -7 -1 137 -25 -7 -1
   Source: PAM Model constructed by the authors
 Following Monke and Pearson (1989), for each production system, let A= revenues in private prices, B=
tradable inputs at private prices, C= domestic factors valued at private prices, E= revenues valued at social
prices, F= tradable inputs valued at social prices, G= domestic factors valuedat social prices. Then:
D = A - (B+C) = private profits which indicate competitiveness under existing policies
H = E - (F+G) = social profits which measure efficiency or comparative advantage
I = A - E = output transfers
J = B - F = input transfers
K = C - G = factors transfers
L = D - H = I - (J+K) = net transfers45
Table A-18: Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) for Commercial Cassava/Maize Production
Systems in Cote d’Ivoire: Net Financial Profitability ($US /ha), Net Social
Profitability ($US/ha), and Net Effects of Policy-Induced Transfers, 1989-1991.
Regional  Output Markets
Bonoua N’douci









Financial Prices 703 11 518 92 683 11
Social Prices 616 16 519 81 719 16
Divergences 87 -5 -0.4 92 -36 -5
                 Source: PAM Model constructed by the author but not shown due to space limitation
                 Note: Divergences calculated as financial prices minus economic prices46
Table A-19: Summary Estimates (in naira) of Post-farm-Level Financial Budget        























Impmech 2310 33 14120 2.96 840
Locmech 1127 20 8761 3.15 -28
Locman 1003 17 8891 3.23 -257
Impman 1094 13 15650 3.28 -691
.47